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Worker Participation and 
Industrial Relations 
The Trend Toward Decentralization 
Edward G. Wertheim 
The author examines the récent developments in worker 
participation in the context of overall patterns in industrial 
relations. In Europe, it appears as a complément to tradi-
tional patterns, an attempt to decentralize influence. Efforts 
toward worker control are likely to hâve limited appeal in 
places such as the United States and Britain where labour 
perceives industrial relations as already fairly decentralizéd. 
The existing Systems of worker participation in Western Europe, 
by almost every account, hâve not been very effective and it would be 
reasonable to conclude that thèse Systems will be considered historically 
as a noble but ill-conceived experiment. Yet an examination of récent 
developments in Western Europe reveals strong évidence from both 
management and labor that participation is still considered a very 
legitimate goal (12) for which both sides are searching for viable mecha-
nisms. Récent changes in structures and processes mean that in some 
form worker participation is likely to become integrated into modem 
industrial relations on the local, national and transnational (EEC) level 
(32). 
Some tentative conclusions can be drawn from the expérience of 
the past 30 years : 
1. The mechanisms hâve been far from effective in achieving the 
lofty goals set for them ; 
2. Most countries will not abandon the attempts at worker 
participation but will implement measures to increase their 
strength and effectiveness ; and 
3. Worker participation in the future will become part of the 
regular industrial relations System and will serve a function of 
decentralizing a tradition 
ally highly centralized la-
bor/management relation-
ship. 
WERTHEIM, Edward G., Assistant 
Professor, School of Management, 
Boston University. 
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As both labor and management realize that profound changes in 
industrial relations are imminent, and that their traditional prérogatives 
are being eroded, they are beginning to approach the topic of worker 
participation on a more practical level. Each is beginning to recognize 
that more than ideology and good will are needed for effective worker 
participation. 
Numerous gênerai surveys (2, 9, 26, 28, 34) as well as spécifie 
case studies (1, 23, 35) of particular situations are available. In this 
paper, participation in the context of overall industrial relations and 
the evolving patterns of European labor unions in particular will be 
viewed, drawing generalizations from events in particular countries. 
It is not suggested that such an approach provides a complète 
understanding of worker participation, but rather, some insight into what 
has happened over the past 30 years and some likely future develop-
ments. 
BRIEF BACKGROUND ON EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
Industrial relations can best be understood in a context of cultural, 
social, political, and économie factors (31). 
European labor, unlike those in America, hâve been highly 
centralized (31). Unions hâve long had deep class, religious, political, 
and ideological meaning, with membership viewed as an expression of 
class feeling (10). Ties between unions and political parties are far 
more explicit than those in the United States. Employers are also 
highly organized, and thèse two highly organized and centralized 
partners, therefore, hâve evolved into a collective bargaining institution 
that itself has been centralized, a pattern which mirrors the political 
structures of the countries themselves. Negotiations are conducted at 
a far higher level than those in this country (31). 
The intégration of organized labor and politics may tend to broaden 
the influences and orientation of labor leaders during negotiations (31) 
which are apt to be quite gênerai. Furthermore, they must relate to a 
large range of diverse institutions with far less focus on issues relating 
to particular enterprises or workers. In as much as unions had a far 
more explicit ideological and political foundation, negotiations reflected 
thèse orientations; i.e., they concentrated on changing society in a 
broad way rather than on ameliorating spécifie ills — a pattern which 
evolved in response to the environmental conditions in the 19th and 
20th century. 
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Changing conditions during the last 30 years hâve brought a 
number of stresses to traditional industrial relations. The overall labor 
shortage has resulted in improved wages and other benefits, and has 
removed the existence of the very adverse conditions that doiminated 
earlier industrial relations, creating a situation that is beginning to 
decrease the salience of the broad contracts worked out between 
centralized employers and unions and government. Some of the forces 
that bound employées of diverse enterprises are dissipating. No longer 
can a common class identity or a common feeling of low standard 
of living provide a compelling force for labor to subordinate local 
interests to broad social and political goals. 
Thèse factors suggest a critical impasse for labor relations in 
Europe, a conclusion that is supported by a number of observers (3,31). 
There is growing pressure to decentralize industrial relations, to supplé-
ment the centralized focus of traditional employee-employer relation-
ships with mechanisms at the 'firm, plant, or even at the shop level, 
although the resuit of thèse pressures is not yet clear. 
In some places, both unions and management are resisting decen-
tralization and the movement of collective bargaining or any other 
mechanism into the firm. More typically, unions hâve tried to extend 
their influence into the firm by radically changing the tradition of broad 
collective agreements by negotiation at the plant level. New institutions 
are emerging at the firm level on which predictably, unions are trying 
to broaden their influence and with which management would like to 
restrict at least the formai ties with organized labor. The most common 
form of thèse institutions is a works council ; other forms include board 
représentation of employées, human relations techniques such as job 
enrichment, and certain types of worker control. Union control may be 
exerted by making union membership a basis for nomination to a 
council. Indeed, Ross reports that some unions view the works council 
as «the prolonged arm of the trade union.» (31, p. 143). Even where 
the union lacks officiai power to influence the works council, informai 
influence usually exists. The works council will be discussed in the next 
section. 
In exploring the implications of thèse trends for the United States, 
the American labor unions, unlike their European counterparts, hâve 
not only a légal existence in the firm, but a deep history and accepted 
function of dealing with social matters and working conditions unique 
to the firm. 
While much of what is being attempted in Europe will match exist-
ing mechanisms in the United States, proposed structures for the works 
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council and worker control in Europe dealing with basic distribution 
of formai authority and access to information of the enterprise far 
exceed présent American approaches to industrial relations and any 
stated goals of most American labor leaders. 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE WORKS COUNCILS 
Given the traditional pattern of industrial relations and the 
changing environmental conditions surrounding thèse patterns, it is not 
surprising that there is an attempt to extend the institutions of labor and 
management relations to a more spécifie orientation at the company 
level. Some forms of works councils in most Western European nations 
were legislated in the years following World War II although they had 
been preceded by Productivity Council during World War I and even 
earlier in many 19th-century Socialist programs, but the serious attempts 
at implementation stem from the later date (34). 
Typically, a works council consists of elected worker représen-
tatives and an equal number of représentatives of management. The 
council usually has the right to receive or demand certain information 
and to express an opinion. In some particular areas the council may 
hâve decisional or veto power (37). 
Although there are few who claim that the works councils hâve 
had much impact on the worker s, on management, or on industrial 
relations in gênerai, there are some positive results attributed to thèse 
Systems. Many observers believe that with even limited success, the 
30 years' expérience was necessary to overcome ideological résistance. 
Management now basically accepts worker participation in theory and 
despite the formai ideology of the more radical unions, most organized 
labor is attempting to make the mechanisms more effective (37). A 
report on European industrial relations suggests that the participatory 
mechanisms hâve opened up both management and the labor unions 
(27, p. 86). 
Part of the problem for the works councils stems from their 
structural foundations. Ideally, the works councils and other mech-
anisms are intended to cover areas where a common interest exists 
between labor and management. Collective bargaining would cover 
issues where management-worker goals are mutually exclusive, a 
distinction that is difficult to support either in theory or practice. 
Asplund contends that the unclear middle rôle of the works council is 
the major problem. « There is no clear démarcation between coopérative 
questions in the works council and conflict questions like wages in the 
bargaining machinery.» (3, p. 52) 
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It is certainly problematic whether any issues rest on mutually 
common assumptions and goals. The works council is supposed to be 
based on coopération while collective bargaining is firmly based on 
negotiation. Rôle conflict is easy to predict frpm the various stances 
of labor and management. Ideologically, it is impossible for many unions 
(especially the more radical) to accept any common interest between 
management and labor, suggesting that any such coopération means 
that the participants are working for management and against labor. 
Such judgments are voiced repeatedly by the more radical unions in 
Belgium and France. 
Referring to the Belgian Social Democrats, Ken Coates states 
that "ne very concept of co-determination is an instrument of inté-
gration into the capitalist System... It tends automatically to associate 
the workers with décisions made within the framework of capitalist 
management of the enterprise. It aims to hâve the workers assume 
equal responsibility for ail décisions made, and automatically places 
their représentatives in an uncomfortable position which tends to inte-
grate them into the existing system... the System is (ut in opération) 
by those seeking to end the class struggle. » (21, p. 81). 
While such logic might be expressed by classic Marxists, it sounds 
anachronistic to our society. Yet, it is apparent that there are many 
structural difficulties to the création and maintenance of an open, 
cooperatively-based, and meaningful body in the context of such deeply 
entrenched institutions as collective bargaining, professional manage-
ment, and the modem complex organization. An earnest conviction 
in the potential success of a works council must rest on some tenuous 
assumptions about the nature of complex organizations as coopérative 
ventures. It is probably more useful to view organizations as a coalition 
of interest groups each vying for limited resources. From this view, the 
future of the works council rests more on negotiation than on colla-
boration. 
Supporters of collective bargaining believe that if matters formerly 
regarded as management prérogatives become subject to some kind of 
binding discussion (as has been proposed for the works council), then 
thèse issues should be subject to collective bargaining. If the works 
council is just a forum for workers to raise questions and management 
to respond (as is typically the case), or at best for management and 
workers to share information, then there is little likelihood of much 
impact on the distribution of power and authority in the firm. 
Other problems stem from the attitudes management brings to the 
participatory schemes ; from the lack of skill in groul processes ; from 
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the workers' (and management's) inadéquate technical background in 
discussing various problems ; and perhaps most critically, the workers' 
lack of critical information. 
Nevertheless, Business Europe reports a survey which indicates 
labor's broad support for the concept of industrial democracy and 
little overt opposition from management (20, p. 69). On the other hand, 
those holding the view that there can be no useful changes within the 
existing économie structure reject the whole theoretical concept of 
worker participation in management, although they do little to overtly 
obstruct its attempted implementation. 
Other unions support participation either in its idéal sensé or as 
a means to extend traditional collective bargaining. In Great Britain 
there is a représentative view that collective bargaining should be 
extended rather than creating new forms of participation. A high officiai 
of the British Trades Union Council states that « collective bargaining 
is the most effective means unions hâve devised to prevent owners 
from abusing their power. » Joint consultation was an ancillary method 
but is likely to be absorbed into the collective bargaining method of 
achieving industrial democracy (38, p. 149). 
RECENT UNION PROPOSALS FOR WORKER PARTICIPATION 
The laws and proposais developed in each country provide a 
clearer picture of developments in worker participation. From the many 
serious and realistic approaches that exist in most European countries, 
it can be concluded that some form of participation is inévitable although 
its ultimate structure is as yet not clear. 
Once again, the Belgian expérience can be cited. Both major 
unions (Social Democrats and Christian Democrats) are pushing for a 
workers council that will exclude management (37), with a proposed 
veto power over such matters as work rules, methods, layoffs, and 
closures, reflecting the unions' continued effort to expand their influence 
over day-to-day opérations. Unions are also planning crash éducation 
courses for the elected représentatives to provide them with technical 
business information. They are also pushing for stronger disclosure 
laws, building on the argument of those like Blanpain who feel that a 
works council without basic information is useless (7). Simultaneously, 
programs of job enrichment and autonomous work groups are also being 
sought. 
In Sweden it has been proposed that collective bargaining be 
extended into areas such as employée participation in supervisory 
104 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 31, NO 1 
practices, hiring, firing, and employée contracts. Work reform programs 
in Volvo, Saab, ASEA (18, p. 8) are being advanced. The central 
union confédération, which up to 1961 had condemned the idea of 
worker participation with management, is now pushing for thèse exper-
iments in order to give low-level workers more authority and respon-
sibility (18, p. 8). Récent législation for worker représentation on boards 
has motivated the workers confédération to launch training programs 
for such appointées (39, p. 118), although this type of représentation 
is considered a minor part of participation. The workers union is 
negotiating for an auditor to provide financial information for the 
workers. 
Thus, Swedish labor is pushing for participation at a number of 
différent levels (2, p. 16). Yet, the unionists hâve not escaped criticism 
of unions elsewhere for their half-hearted attempts at instituting demo-
cracy (27, p. 20), and it is moving the Swedish labor unions to attempt 
to strenghten the formai structures of participation a shift from voïuntary 
coopération and consultation to legally-instituted rights of co-deter-
mination. 
In Norway the unions hâve been critical of the works council 
with the Norwegian Fédération of Trade Unions urging board représen-
tation (2, p. 44). As in Sweden, Norwegian labor has been supporting 
shop floor experiments in self-directing work groups, and is moving past 
voïuntary participation toward more formai rights for workers in man-
agement décisions. 
In France a commission appointed by Président d'Estaing attacked 
both the unions and the employers for backward attitudes, proposing 
board représentation for the workers and laws forcing companies to 
share information on such areas as salaries, benefits, schedules turn-
over, and promotion. The Communist-related union, the CGT, which 
has long based its program on the irreconcilable clash of interests, 
termed the report a «reform strick» (18, p. 57), but has relented on some 
of its anti-participation. Nevertheless, it is still fearful that an intégration 
of management and workers would cripple its demands. The idéologies 
of even the more moderate unions (CFTC and CGT-FO) restrict par-
ticipation; the concept of class struggle, although certainly less com-
pelling than formerly, still severely restricts unions from wholeheartedly 
endorsing attempts to bring about effective perticipetion in management. 
The existing consultative System, not widely used, is limited to 
areas that raise no conflict (6, p. 87). In other directions the government 
has pushed profit sharing, and the CGT and CGT-FO hâve suggested 
WORKER PARTICIPATION AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 105 
that there is more to be gained through collective bargaining. Garson 
concludes that the «dead hand of the CGT impedes any substantial 
moves toward worker control in France. » (24, p. 19). Any developments 
in participation hâve to counter an environment that has reinforced 
rigid social classes, lack of opportunity, and low social intégration. 
There hâve been some dramatic instances of worker assertiveness 
(e.g., the Lip case in 1973 and the Jaeger plant at Caen where workers 
won a right to affect the speed of the assembly Une), and the French 
government continues to urge a mild form of participation. After the 
1968 revolts, the NFDT supported decentralized Systems of self-man-
agement. It might be stated that the unions support «démocratie man-
agement in a socialist perspective» (14, p. 135). Worker participation 
similar to that in the Northern European countries is unlikely to make 
much progress in France where unions continue to see industrial rela-
tions as a class struggle, a win/lose situation between management and 
labor, a stance which leads the unions to resist efforts that might help 
both the worker and the enterprise. Although formai worker partici-
pation is unlikely to advance very far, Business Europe suggests that 
«the methods themselves can be powerfully effective and spécifie 
companies will likely find advantages to adopting some forms of worker 
participation» (14, p. 135). 
In Britain, until recently, there has been little union support for 
European-style worker participation. It was not until 1973 that the Trade 
Union Council and the Labour party backed the idea of industrial 
democracy when the TUC formally adopted a position in support of 
co-determination, a position regarded by many as less than serious (38, 
p. 150). 
British unions hâve expressed little interest so far in works coun-
cils. There is, rather, more interest in financial participation and in 
extending collective bargaining following the pattern of the United 
States (22, p. 127), a position consonant with labor's emphasis on shop 
floor powers exercised through strong shop stewards. To the British 
this represents industrial democracy. Récent government acts to extend 
participation hâve been opposed by the TUC and regarded as a drive 
to destroy the power of the shop stewards and to undermine collective 
bargaining (30). Historical British conservative support for mild forms of 
worker participation may explain labor's hesitancy to endorse conti-
nental forms of participation. Board représentation, a mechanism not 
perceived as a threat by the TUC, is supported if worker directors are 
chosen through «trade union machinery» (38, p. 150). 
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In the Netherlands unions hâve leaned toward a stronger form of 
approach. They hâve also supported profit-sharing schemes and shop 
floor expérimentation (2, p. 37). They hâve pushed increasingly for real 
power to counterbalance that of capital (40, p. 140). It is anticipated 
that a law will be enacted to provide for a form of profit sharing through 
a union-administered fund to increase its influence and potential control 
of a company. A strengthing of the worker participation law is also 
being sought. (16, p. 278). 
In West Germany although ties between trade unions and works 
councils are informai the unions prépare slates of candidates for council 
élections since approximately 90% of the membership are union mem-
bers, a number vestly exceeding German union membership (2, p. 12). 
As in other countries, the unions are pressing for co-determination 
based on equal représentation of workers and management to counter 
the présent minority représentation of workers in most industries (13, 
p. 92). « Humanization of work» efforts at the shop floor level are also 
being pushed. 
Despite some claims that efforts toward participation hâve been far 
from effective, Van Gorcum cited évidence that co-determination gives 
unions a considérable influence over the climate of the enterprise and 
over social policies, and through seats on the boards of supervisors 
provides information to workers (36, p. 12). Garson claims that there 
has been a spread of unionism to non-union firms (24, p. 9). 
Finally, there is qualified union support of a European Corporate 
Law that would include some form of worker participation. The prin-
cipal labor group of West Germany, the DGB, suggests that the works 
council should be able to negotiate where no collective agreements 
exist. Along with other major European unions, the DGB supports a 
plan that will ensure union influence (25), a position expressed with 
respect to the proposed « Eurocompany» taken by unions in gênerai. 
Unions support the principle of labor représentation when they regard 
it to be more than symbolic (25). 
UNIONS AND WORKER PARTICIPATION: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
Unlike their European counterparts, American unions in gênerai 
hâve historically rejected or de-emphasized political activity and 
demands for radical social change but instead, hâve pushed for immé-
diate improvements (33, p. 149). Until 1900 there had been forces 
supporting industrial self government (Knights of Labor, and IWW) but 
the mainstream of labor emphasized collective bargaining. Unlike 
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European labor, much more emphasis was placed on local agreements 
in the U.S. Demands for radical change were never a compelling force 
for the majority of American organized labor. Rather than demanding 
«shared power» in overall management functions and in the formu-
lation of policy, unions hâve preferred to défend the worker's point 
of view in bargaining (4). Distrust of worker participation may stem 
from small attempts at employée représentative plans where they were 
used for anti-union purposes (33, p. 155). 
The most distinguishing factor in American patterns of collective 
bargaining is its decentralization : The union has a présence in the 
plant. Perhaps the stance of American unions is best expressed by 
Sturmthal: «Collective bargaining is an indirect way of participation;... 
The refusai of United States labor in its search for industrial democracy, 
to accept open managerial responsibility as well perhaps as failure to 
develop a political party, has compelled United States Unions to use 
collective bargaining in highly ingenious and inventive fashion. » (33, 
p. 173). 
Clearly, American unions consider collective bargaining a form of 
industrial democracy. If the goal of individual democracy is a sensé 
of control over one's work, the American System moves toward that 
goal. Tannenbaum suggests that in contrast to the countries with work 
councils, in America workers typically «perceive» a greater sensé of 
influence over their work and the enterprise than do their European 
counterparts (Tannenbaum). 
Irving Bluestone expressed the current view of labor very well 
in a récent speech in which he distinguished between managing the 
enterprise and managing the job (8). 
In the United States, labor contracts, with their hundreds of provisions 
establishing and protecting the rights of workers, leave substantially to 
management the sole responsibility to détermine the products to be 
manufactured, the location plants, the schedules of production..., to 
improving wages, benefîts, conditions, leaving managing the enterprise to 
management. 
Bluestone suggests that if approaches to worker participation 
occur, they will stem from practical rather than ideological conditions, 
intimating that there will be strong interest in shop level participation 
as there has been in Europe. 
It is easily discerned that worker participation in décision making will 
more readily spring up with regard to those aspects of working life most 
immediately and noticeably affected. Managing the job is more immédiate 
and urgent... worker concern for managing the enterprise is more variable 
(8, p. 19). 
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There is little évidence of much future change from the presently 
discernable course of American unions. The présent System is consider-
ed a highly developed form of participation and unions in this nation 
will continue to reject participation in management, or in Sturmthal's 
words, they will continue to be a critic rather than a partner, to influence 
through negotiation bodies rather than managerial bodies. 
Hence, while formai bodies of worker participation following the 
European model are unlikely, there may be some informai develop-
ments. As the level of éducation rises, and as more organizations are 
based on more complex goals, technologies and structures, there may 
be increased participation and decentralized decision-making stemming 
from the évolution of the firm itself. 
Bok and Dunlop are even stronger on this topic: 
If anything, the prospects for worker participation seem even more remote 
in America than in Europe. Much of the intellectual backing for coopérations 
does not exist in this country. In addition, works councils are not needed 
in America to fill a vacuum at the plant and company level, for unlike 
the situation in Europe, unions in the U.S. hâve established vigorous local 
bodies to represent employées at the workplace. The American labor 
movement, moreover, has been hostile to works councils ever since WW II, 
when employers sought to use such employée-représentation plans as 
company unions to win the loyalty of their employées away from the 
unions. Hence, labor would doubtless oppose such consultative bodies 
unless they were firmly under union control... The American worker has 
given very little évidence that he cares at ail about participating in the 
running of the business... As a resuit, the growth points of collective 
bargaining are more likely to be in enlarging the employées' freedom and 
interest in his own work. (10, p. 345). 
CONCLUSION 
Récent developments and interest in worker participation can be 
better understood in relation to the evolving industrial relation system, 
early history of collective bargaining, current growing complexity of 
organizations, decreasing class consciousness, and gênerai lack of 
unemployment. Worker participation schemes represent one mani-
festation of a tendency to decentralize labor relations, to complément 
traditional highly centralized bargaining, and to tailor agreements to 
the particular requirements, demands, and conditions of spécifie firms. 
The création of a permanent autonomous body independent of man-
agement and labor is unlikely; it is more likely that those bodies such 
as works councils and the laws surrounding those bodies will be incor-
porated into an enlarged collective bargaining system. Since the U.S. 
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already has a relatively decentralized industrial relations pattern, there 
is little appeal among unions in this country for works councils, or 
worker control. However, in ail Western countries, unions will in-
creasingly endorse other forms of worker participation, especiaily those 
mechanisms that will increase a worker's control over his immédiate 
job setting. 
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La participation des travailleurs et les régimes de relations indus-
trielles 
On peut examiner les récents développements de la participation des travailleurs 
dans le contexte général des régimes de relations professionnelles. 
En Europe, une des raisons de l'insistance pour la participation des travailleurs 
se trouve dans la traditionnelle centralisation des relations industrielles. Aussi, plutôt 
qu'une orientation vers une nouvelle direction, la participation des travailleurs peut y 
être considérée comme un complément aux modèles traditionnels dans un effort de 
décentralisation. 
Il est très improbable que des organismes comme les conseils d'entreprise réali-
seront un jour l'objectif d'autonomie au-delà des intérêts sectoriels des travailleurs et 
de la direction. De plus, les efforts en faveur du contrôle ouvrier vont probablement 
recevoir une réponse limitée dans des pays où, par exemple aux États-Unis et en Grande 
Bretagne, les travailleurs perçoivent les relations industrielles comme étant déjà passa-
blement décentralisées. 
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